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**IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA**

WANDA HOOTEN,)	
)	
Appellant-Defendant,)	
)	
vs.)	No. 49A02-0606-CR-487
)	
STATE OF INDIANA,)	
)	
Appellee-Plaintiff.)	

APPEAL FROM THE MARION SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Israel Cruz, Judge
Cause No. 49F10-0511-CM-197640

March 6, 2007

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

VAIDIK, Judge

Case Summary

Wanda Hooten appeals her conviction for criminal conversion, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction. Finding that the State presented sufficient evidence to support Hooten's conviction, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Facts and Procedural History

On the evening of November 11, 2005, Hooten visited the home of Mildred Reeves. The two women had known each other for several years, and Hooten had been to Reeves' home on many occasions. About two hours before Hooten's visit, Reeves had been to the grocery store, and when she returned home, she had approximately \$200.00 in her pocketbook. During Hooten's visit, Hooten and Reeves sat on opposite sides of Reeves' dining room table, and Reeves' pocketbook was close to her on the table. At some point, Hooten told Reeves that she was sick and wanted some water to take a pill. When Reeves returned from the kitchen with a glass of water, she noticed that her pocketbook was now open on Hooten's side of the table. Reeves looked inside her pocketbook and discovered that the \$200.00 was missing. When Reeves asked Hooten if she had taken the money, Hooten denied having done so and left Reeves' house. Reeves never found the missing money.

The State charged Hooten with criminal conversion, a Class A misdemeanor.¹ After a bench trial, the trial court found Hooten guilty as charged. Hooten now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

¹ Ind. Code § 35-43-4-3(a).

On appeal, Hooten raises a single issue: whether the evidence is sufficient to support her conviction for criminal conversion. Upon a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction, a reviewing court does not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. *McHenry v. State*, 820 N.E.2d 124, 126 (Ind. 2005). We must consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. *Id.* We must affirm if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence could have allowed a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. *Id.* To sustain a conviction for criminal conversion, the State was required to present evidence tending to show that Hooten knowingly or intentionally exerted unauthorized control over Reeves' \$200.00. *See* Ind. Code § 35-43-4-3(a). Hooten argues that the State failed to do so. We disagree.

Hooten essentially contends that Reeves' testimony, standing alone, is insufficient to support the trial court's judgment.² It is well-established, however, that the uncorroborated testimony of one witness may be sufficient to sustain a conviction on appeal. *Reed v. State*, 748 N.E.2d 381, 396 (Ind. 2001). Here, Reeves testified that she had \$200.00 in her pocketbook when Hooten arrived, that she went to the kitchen and returned to find her pocketbook open on Hooten's side of the table, and that she looked in her pocketbook and discovered that the \$200.00 was missing. Hooten also testified and denied having taken Reeves' money. After hearing all of this testimony, the trial court stated, "I believe Mrs. Reeves. I do not believe Mrs. Hooten." Tr. p. 45. Hooten asks us

² Hooten does not, however, seek to invoke the "incredible dubiousity" doctrine, which applies "where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt." *Thompson v. State*, 765 N.E.2d 1273, 1274 (Ind. 2002).

to reweigh the evidence and to judge the credibility of the witnesses. This we cannot do.

McHenry, 820 N.E.2d at 126.

Affirmed.

BAILEY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.